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Abstract: 
 
Background: To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, 
computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible 
donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for 
transplantation.   
Methods: Demographic data of patients who had been evaluated for live donor kidney 
transplantation but found to be incompatible with their potential donor (because of ABO blood 
group or positive crossmatch) were submitted for computer analysis and matching. Data included 
ABO and HLA types of donor and recipient, %PRA and specificity of recipient alloantibody, 
donor/recipient relationship, and the reason the donor was incompatible. The data set used for the 
initial simulation included 29 patients with one donor each and 16 patients with multiple donors 
for a total of 45 patients and 68 donor/patient pairs. In addition, a simulation based on 
OPTN/SRTR data was used to further assess the practical importance of multiple exchange 
combinations. 
Results: If only exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs were allowed, a maximum of 8 
patient-donor pairs in the data set could exchange kidneys. If 3-way exchanges were also 
allowed, a maximum of 11 pairs could exchange kidneys. Simulations with OPTN/SRTR data 
demonstrate that the increase in the number of potential transplants if 3-way exchanges are 
allowed is robust, and does not depend on the particular patients in our sample. 
Conclusions:  A computerized matching protocol can be used to identify donor/recipient pairs 
from a registry of incompatible pairs who can potentially enter into donor exchanges that 
otherwise would not readily occur.  
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Introduction: 
The live unrelated donor has become a major source of kidneys for transplantation. In 2003, 
more that 30% of live kidney donors in the United States were biologically unrelated to their 
recipient (1). The survival rate of a kidney transplant from an unrelated donor is now known to 
be excellent, with a 10 year survival equivalent to a kidney transplant from a sibling 
haploidentical to the recipient. (2).  
Nevertheless, some potential kidney transplant recipients cannot identify a compatible donor 
within family or friendships because of an ABO blood type or crossmatch incompatibility. 
Although these immunologic obstacles have been overcome in some instances by desensitization 
protocols, these protocols have not been widely adopted because of the cost of their 
administration and the uncertain possibility of rejection (3, 4). Thus, some regions of the country 
have initiated ad hoc programs of paired live kidney donation between incompatible 
donor/recipient pairs so that transplantation could still be accomplished (5). These paired live 
donor transplants have been well received by the patients and centers, as they provide an 
opportunity for transplantation that otherwise would not be possible. However, paired donation is 
not being performed frequently because a systematic approach has not been developed to 
identify a sufficient number of incompatible pairs who can undergo simultaneous transplantation.  
To expand the opportunity for paired donation, computerized matching algorithms were 
designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of 
incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for live donor kidney transplantation (6, 7, 8). We 
report here on the effectiveness of the program by means of a simulation based on actual patient 
data. In addition, simulations based on Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (OPTN/SRTR) data have been used to further assess 
the practical importance of multiple exchange combinations. The subsequent simulations with 
OPTN/SRTR data demonstrate that the results are not dependent on special features of this 
patient population. 
 
Methods: 
I. Simulation with Local Patient Data 
Demographic data of patients who had been evaluated for live donor kidney transplantation 
but found to be incompatible with their potential donor (because of ABO blood group or a 
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positive crossmatch) were submitted for computer analysis and matching. These entry data 
included the ABO blood type and HLA specificity of the donor and recipient, the %PRA (panel 
reactivity antibody) and specificity of recipient alloantibody (class I and II), the donor/recipient 
relationship (friend, spouse or other family member), and the reason the donor was previously 
determined to be incompatible. The HLA profile included the HLA-A, B, Bw4/6, DR, DQ and 
DR51/52/53 antigen types of both donors and recipients.  
 
HLA antibodies 
Recipient alloantibody specificities against antigens encoded at the same loci (A, B etc.) 
were determined. If antibody specificity could not be accurately determined due to a very high 
PRA, then “safe antigens” (i.e. those that were consistently negative in antibody screens) were 
included. Cw locus antigen types were not available for all potential recipients or incompatible 
donors; however, there was no patient with Cw locus specific reactivity. 
Class II PRAs had not been determined for some patients prior to simulation. If the patient 
was otherwise unsensitized (n=10), the class II PRA was assumed to be 0%. If the patient had 
class I antibody and previous donor(s) HLA types were known (n=2), their previously 
mismatched class II antigens and any related split antigens were included as antibody 
specificities. If the patient had class I antibody and previous donor HLA types were not known 
(n=2), only self HLA class II antigens were considered to be safe. 
 
HLA antigen assignments 
There were 68 donor recipient pairs submitted for the simulation. In some instances there 
was more than one donor for a particular recipient (n=16).  However, complete HLA entry data 
was not available on all of the submitted pairs (n= 35). Some donor workups were discontinued 
once an incompatibility was identified. In these cases, HLA-A, B and DR antigens were 
“assigned” to the incompatible donor, using HLA phenotypes from a list of deceased donors 
obtained from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Since HLA-Bw4/6, DR51/52/53 
and DQ antigens were not included in the UNOS donor list, these antigens were assigned based 
on the most common associations with the HLA-B and DR antigens of that donor. Assignments 
were made as follows: 
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Incompatible unrelated donors (spouse or friend) with incomplete HLA typing data (n=16) 
were assigned the same HLA phenotype as the first deceased donor in the UNOS donor list with 
the same ABO blood group (and race if known) as the incompatible unrelated donor.  
Incompatible sibling donors with incomplete HLA typing data (n=9) were assigned HLA 
types from the deceased donor list based on the inheritance of HLA antigens. One quarter of the 
untyped sibling donors were assumed to be HLA identical and assigned the same HLA 
phenotype as their recipient. One half of the untyped sibling donors were assumed to share one 
haplotype with their recipient and were assigned the HLA phenotype of the first UNOS donor 
that shared one A, one B and one DR locus antigen with their recipient. One quarter of the 
untyped sibling donors were assumed to share no haplotypes with their recipient and were 
assigned the HLA type of the next deceased donor on the UNOS list with the same blood group.  
Incompatible parent and child donors (n=8) were assumed to share one haplotype and were 
assigned HLA phenotypes as described for sibling donors assumed to share one haplotype. In 
one case, a deceased donor with an appropriate HLA type could not be found for a child donor 
whose mother was homozygous for a rare HLA-B antigen (B81). In that case, a donor who 
shared A and DR locus antigens was identified and one B locus antigen was changed to B81 so 
that they appeared to share a complete haplotype. 
Other incompatible related donors (uncle, cousin; n=2) were assumed to share no haplotypes 
in both cases.  
 
Matching algorithms 
Accounting for ABO blood type and tissue-type incompatibilities, maximal sets of exchanges 
were identified, i.e. exchanges that included the maximum number of patients when: 
• only 2-way exchanges are allowed, 
• 2-way and 3-way exchanges are allowed, 
• any size exchange is allowed. 
The maximal two-way exchanges are found through different versions of the algorithm of J. 
Edmonds (9), as discussed in Roth et al. (7). Maximal 2-way, 3-way and maximal unrestricted 
exchanges are found through various formulations of the exchange problem as an integer 
programming problem. The integer programming formulation maximizes the number of 
transplants subject to the constraint that the cycle size not exceed the specified exchange size (2-
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way, 3-way, or unrestricted).  In the case of 3-way exchanges, we additionally constrain the 
solution to have the minimum number of 3-way exchanges (and hence the maximum number of 
2-way exchanges) consistent with maximizing the number of transplants.  The integer programs 
were solved with the commercial software CPLEX. 
 
Assumptions made in simulation with local patient data 
Donors were considered to be compatible if they did not have any of the antigens that the 
potential recipient had called antibodies against and none of the previously mismatched antigens.  
For class I and II high PRA patients where recipient antibody specificity could not be determined 
and only “safe antigens” were provided, donors were considered to be compatible if the donor’s 
HLA type included only the potential recipient’s own HLA antigens or “safe” antigens assigned 
for that patient. For potential recipients with high PRA in one class and low or medium PRA in 
the other class, donors were considered to be compatible if they had only the recipient’s self or 
“safe” antigens in the high PRA class, and did not have any of the antigens that the recipient had 
antibodies against nor any of the previously mismatched antigens of the other class. 
 
II. Simulation with OPTN/SRTR patient data 
To determine if the results from this particular patient dataset can be generalized to a larger 
patient population, we conducted simulations based on data from the U.S. Organ Procurement 
and Transplant Network (OPTN) and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) 
2003 Annual Report, covering the period 1993-2002 (retrieved from http://www.optn.org on 
11/22/2004). The purpose of these simulations is to verify that the difference between the 2-way 
and the 2- and 3-way exchanges that we see in the patient dataset is not an artifact of particular 
properties of that dataset. Distributions of (simulated) patient and donor blood types, gender and 
PRA distribution of the patients, and frequency of spousal donations, were generated using 
OPTN/SRTR data. Patient characteristics are from the new waiting list registrations data, living 
donor relational type distribution are from living donor transplants data. Numerical estimates are 
different than in the patient population considered above, but the simulations confirm how 
different exchange options and population sizes influence the frequency of additional live-donor 
transplants, across patient populations with different characteristics. 
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The probability of a positive crossmatch was based on patient PRA data. For simplicity in 
interpreting the results, patients were simulated in discrete PRA levels as follows:   
• each low PRA patient (PRA <10%) has a positive crossmatch probability of 5% with a 
random donor, 
• each medium PRA patient (10-80%) has a positive crossmatch probability of 45%,  
• each high PRA patient (>80%) has a positive crossmatch probability of 90%. 
The positive crossmatch probability between female patients and their husbands is 
approximately 33%, compared to approximately 11% between random pairs (10). We modeled 
the negative crossmatch probability between a female patient and her donor husband as 75% (i.e. 
(1-.33)/(1-.11)) of the negative crossmatch probability with a random donor:  
PRA* = 100 – 0.75(100 - PRA) 
 
Patient-donor pairs were randomly generated using the population characteristics (assuming 
one donor per patient.) A pair was included in the sample population if they were incompatible 
by blood type or positive crossmatch. Incompatible pairs were generated until a sample size of n 
(n=25 or 100) incompatible pairs was reached. On average, 48 (198) unrelated patient-donor 
pairs were needed to produce 25 (100) incompatible pairs. Monte-Carlo simulation of 500 
random populations was used for population sizes of 25 and 100. Once the incompatible pairs 
were generated, the same matching algorithm as described for the simulation with local patient 
data was used. The probability of a positive crossmatch was the same as that used to generate the 
incompatible pairs.  
 
 Two simulations were conducted. For simplicity only non-blood-related patient-donor 
pairs were considered in the first simulation. The influence of allowing 3-way exchanges in 
addition to 2-way exchanges can be most clearly assessed in a simple simulation, with fewer 
modeling assumptions than would be needed to try to simulate the general patient and donor 
population. However, in the second simulation a modified version was tested, with additional ad 
hoc assumptions regarding the number and relationship of potential donors that a patient may 
have available to them. These assumptions were similar to those used by Zenios et al (10) except 
for 3 assumptions chosen differently to make the simulation more suitable for our present 
purposes: (i) We assume that each patient can have 0,1 or 2 parents, 0 or 1 sibling, and 0 or 1 
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spouse (a total of 12 possibilities) as willing and medically fit donors and that each of these 12 
scenarios occurs with equal probability. (ii) We use three levels of PRA sensitivity, low, medium 
and high, as we did in our original simulations above; and we statistically update the crossmatch 
probabilities of the patients with their “blood related” donors using a statistical model based on 
their PRA levels and relationship. (iii) We generate a single ABO genotype distribution that is 
the unconditional distribution for the US population obtained from the race conditional 
distributions reported in Zenios et al; we assume that each patient and donor belongs to this 
composite race. 
   
Results: 
I. Simulation using local patient data 
Makeup of patient data set 
The data set used for the initial simulation included 29 patients with one donor each and 16 
patients with multiple donors for a total of 45 patients and 68 donor/patient pairs. The ABO 
types and the levels of antibody reactivity of these patients were evaluated. Twenty-three patients 
(51%) were ABO-0, 14 (31%) were ABO-A, 6 (13%) were ABO-B and 2 (4%) were ABO-AB. 
Twenty-one of the patients (47%) had PRA ≤15% with no defined HLA antibodies; 8 (18%) 
were moderately sensitized, with PRA between 16 and 79%; and 16 patients (36%) were highly 
sensitized with either class I or II PRA ≥80%. This reflects a more highly sensitized population 
than is present on the deceased donor waitlist in our area (77% with PRA ≤15%, 13% with PRA 
16-79%; 10% with PRA ≥80%), which can be attributed to the increased likelihood that a highly 
sensitized patient would have a crossmatch incompatible donor.  
 
Matching results 
Of the 45 patients in the dataset, 14 were unmatchable because there was no donor 
compatible with the prospective recipient. Two more patients were then rendered unmatchable 
because they were not compatible with any of the remaining donors. Although 29 patients out of 
the original 45 (64%) had a compatible donor in the dataset, only 15 patient-donor pairs (33%) 
had a patient-donor pair that was mutually compatible with them (Table 1). Moreover, many 
pairs were mutually compatible with the same pair (e.g. pairs 12, 30 and 38 were mutually 
compatible only with pair 29), further limiting the number of possible exchanges.  
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Exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs (2-way exchanges) 
If only exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs are allowed, a maximum of 8 patient-
donor pairs in the data set could exchange kidneys, in four 2-way exchanges. If all matches were 
confirmed to be compatible, 8 of the 45 patients could receive transplants. One example of the 
possible paired exchanges is shown in Table 2A, involving three ABO-A, three ABO-B, and two 
ABO-O patients. Under these exchanges two moderately sensitized patients (R29 and R45) could 
receive transplants. There are a number of alternative ways in which these 4 exchanges can be 
organized (data not shown). Maximizing the number of exchanges has implications for which 
patient-donor pairs are matched. For example while pairs R1 and R29 are mutually compatible 
(Table 1), if they exchange kidneys then only 6 patients can receive transplants through pairwise 
exchanges, instead of 8.  
 
Exchanges involving multiple patient-donor pairs 
Exchanges involving up to three patient-donors pairs are logistically feasible by 
accomplishing these surgical procedures within one day. The advantage of such exchanges is 
readily demonstrated in the dataset: when 3-way exchanges are also allowed, a maximum of 11 
patient-donor pairs could be identified who could exchange kidneys. The exchanges included 
one 2-way exchange (between two pairs) and three 3-way exchanges (i.e. three exchanges that 
each involves three patient-donor pairs). Four of the recipients are ABO-B, three are ABO-A, 
three are ABO-O and one is ABO-AB. Five sensitized patients, including one highly sensitized 
patient with a class I PRA of 93%, could potentially receive transplants. The details of these 
exchanges are shown in Table 2B. 
The data also admit a possible 5-way exchange. If such an exchange is allowed with the test 
dataset, 12 patient-donor pairs could exchange kidneys. This would be accomplished with two 2-
way exchanges, one 3-way exchange and one 5-way exchange. The details of the 5-way 
exchange are shown in Table 2C. Although not logistically feasible in most cases, it maximizes 
the number of patients who could receive transplants and demonstrates the power of the 
matching algorithm.  
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II. Simulation using OPTN/SRTR data 
The distributions of patient and living donor data used in this simulation are shown in Table 
3. For each population size, there was substantial gain from larger than 2-way exchanges, mostly 
from 3-way exchanges, which is similar to the result shown with our local patient data. As the 
population size increased the percentage of patients who could be helped by 2-way exchanges 
increased, and as a result the benefit from larger exchanges declined slightly. But 3-way 
exchange accounts for an even larger percentage of the benefit from larger exchanges (last row 
in Table 4 and Table 5). In the maximal 2-&3-way exchanges, when the population was n=25, 
61% of the patients were in 3-way exchanges while 39% of the patients were in 2-way 
exchanges. When the population was n=100, 49% of the patients were in 3-way exchanges and 
51% of the patients were in 2-way exchanges.  
O donors account for only 23% of the incompatible patient-donor pairs, since O donors are 
mostly compatible with their intended recipients, while O patients are 59% of all patients in 
incompatible patient-donor pairs, since they can only receive O kidneys (Table 4). Similarly, 
high PRA patients are only 10% of all patients, but 18% in the population of incompatible 
patient-donor pairs (Table 5). However, exchanges provide some good news for highly sensitized 
patients, since selection also operates on the distribution of incompatible patient-donor types.  
High PRA patients are 35% of those with incompatible O-donors (Table 5), since, conditional on 
being incompatible with an O donor, a patient is more likely to have a high PRA. 
Because O donors are potentially a match for any patient, high PRA patients with O donors 
have many opportunities for an exchange, and hence a high chance of success, even though they 
are incompatible with most donors. This is so even when the population of incompatible patient-
donor pairs is only 25: Table 5 shows that in each such population there are on average just over 
two high PRA patients with O donors, and they have a 36% chance of being included in an 
exchange if only 2-way exchanges are possible, but a 51% chance if 3-way exchanges are also 
possible (and a 55% chance if exchanges of any size are possible).  These patients do much 
better in a population of 100 incompatible patient-donor pairs: on average there will be just over 
8 highly sensitized patients with O donors, and their chances of being included in a match are 
69% when only 2-way exchange is possible, 91% when 3-way exchange is also possible, and 
93% when exchanges can be of any size.  Thus the disadvantage of being highly sensitized is 
ameliorated by having an easy-to-match O donor. In general, high PRA patients with any kind of 
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donor are helped by a larger population of incompatible patient-donor pairs, and when larger 
exchanges are possible.  
A modified version of this initial model was also tested. As shown in Table 4B, this 
simulation generated similar findings to the original less complicated model, demonstrating that 
different modeling assumptions about the number and relationship of donors for each patient are 
not crucial assumptions. The predictions about the benefit of allowing both 2-way and 3-way 
exchanges are evident with both models, and both models confirm the advantage of 3-way 
exchanges as is shown with our local patient data.  
 
Discussion: 
Any adult can be a live kidney donor who is medically well, psychosocially suitable, and 
willing to donate. The issue for the potential transplant recipient is to find a donor compatible by 
blood type and crossmatch reactivity. For those who have a willing but incompatible donor, the 
concept of paired kidney donation was first proposed by Rapaport in 1986 (11). (See also Ross et 
al. (12)). However, this approach was not considered more extensively until ample data 
confirmed that the absence of an HLA match of the donor recipient pair would not be detrimental 
to outcome (2, 13).  Today, centers around the world are developing policies for paired and three 
way donation (4, 14-18) when incompatible donor/recipient pairs are identified.  
To further increase the number of transplants that can be done via optimal matching of donor 
exchanges, expansion of the donor/recipient pair pool is necessary. The development of multi-
center or regional exchange programs would provide opportunities for such expansion, although 
there are potential obstacles that would need to be resolved. These include the need for donors to 
travel should centers be far apart, the logistics of crossmatching when multiple centers are 
involved, and issues related to data sharing and HIPAA requirements. In addition, all of the 
impediments that are known for any living donor will also be issues in donor exchanges.  
It is now evident that there may be multiple ways to arrange exchanges (6, 7). Some of the 
issues involved in identifying sets of exchanges are related to those that arise in other kinds of 
matching problems, such as the matching of medical residents (19-21), and matching students to 
schools (22-24).  In these cases too, there were substantial logistical difficulties associated with 
coordinating diverse centers with a tradition of operating independently.  But there were 
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substantial gains to be made by making matches in a coordinated way, and the logistical 
difficulties in doing so were successfully overcome. 
This report provides important evidence that a computerized matching protocol can be used 
to identify donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs who can potentially enter 
into donor exchanges. Actual patient data from a relatively small dataset of 45 patients and 68 
incompatible donor/patient pairs were used to show that potentially compatible donors could be 
identified for 24% (n=11) of the patients using logistically feasible 2-way and 3-way exchanges.  
The results of the computerized matching protocol demonstrate the utility of optimizing 
exchanges, i.e. matching pairs so that as many patients as possible can receive an exchange. 
Similar conclusions about the use of a computerized system have been recently reported by 
Segev et al (26). However, depending on the number of patients added to the registry on a 
regular basis, and the frequency that the match program is run, it is possible that there will be 
few opportunities to allow for optimal exchanges to be chosen unless patients are expected to 
wait for a defined period of time before matched exchanges are allowed to proceed. Balancing 
the wish to ensure the maximum number of patients receive transplants vs. the need for 
individual patients to receive transplants expeditiously may prove to be a challenge.  
The ability to perform 3-way or more exchanges has been demonstrated to increase the 
number of possible exchanges that can be identified, both using the local patient data as well as 
the results based on the simulation involving larger populations of patient/donor pairs. It must be 
noted that there are many details that were not included in these simulations that might affect 
whether or not an exchange would proceed, including age, size, and preferences of the recipients, 
donors and physicians. But these factors are likely to be relatively consistent between the 2-way 
and 3-way exchange groups. Allowing 3-way exchanges does not prevent a 2-way exchange 
from being done should the circumstances require it. However, the use of multiple exchange 
combinations can greatly increase the logistical difficulties of such exchanges. Most donor 
exchange programs perform donor nephrectomies simultaneously to prevent the possibility of 
one donor withdrawing his or her commitment after the other donor has undergone nephrectomy. 
Multiple simultaneous surgeries can stretch the capabilities of many centers and require a great 
deal of careful coordination, but 3-way exchanges (which require six surgeries) have been 
demonstrated to be a viable option (16).  
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 Theoretical results in a simple model in which there are no positive crossmatches 
between patients and other patients’ donors suggest that the importance of three way exchanges 
in achieving maximal matchings arises primarily from the distribution of ABO blood types, and 
will not vanish even with very large populations (25). The additional transplants facilitated by 
three way exchanges comes both from high PRA patients (who may have idiosyncratic matching 
patterns), and from the way that O-donors (who are often the donors of high PRA pairs) help to 
fill the gap if there are different numbers of A-B and B-A pairs. For example, in a situation 
where there is an excess of B donor-A patient pairs, a (rare) O donor-B patient pair can form a 3-
way exchange with a B donor-A patient pair together with a (very common) A donor-O patient 
pair. Therefore rare patient-donor pairs are benefiting from the 3-way exchange but are also 
benefiting the two other pairs involved in the exchange, thus increasing the number of patients 
benefiting from exchange. 
The present analysis focuses only on direct exchanges between incompatible patient-donor 
pairs.  The same techniques can be used to incorporate indirect exchange between patient-donor 
pairs and the deceased donor waitlist, and undirected donor kidneys, sometimes with a potential 
to facilitate exchanges involving additional incompatible patient-donor pairs.  These indirect 
exchanges involve identifying not only the cycles of mutual compatibility that permit direct 
exchange, but also “chains” that begin with an undirected donor or end in a patient on the 
deceased donor waitlist.  The possibility of such additional exchanges increases the total number 
of transplants that can be arranged (6). For example, an O blood type non directed (Good 
Samaritan) donor could be entered into the computer matching system and be identified as 
compatible with a sensitized recipient; thus, enabling the originally intended donor for the 
incompatible recipient to give to another recipient.  
It is important to note that the computer program can identify only potentially compatible 
donor and recipient pairs. Crossmatches will be required to confirm compatibility. An 
incompatible crossmatch between a pair that the matching algorithm identifies as compatible will 
result in the transplants not being performed, and in cases of 3-way exchanges may prevent three 
transplants from being performed. A priority should be to minimize the number of potentially 
compatible donors who may be identified but later determined to be incompatible by crossmatch, 
and to thus limit the number of times a given donor must be crossmatched with a different 
recipient. Therefore, steps must be taken to ensure that compatibility can be predicted as 
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accurately as possible before the crossmatch is done. Extensive antibody screening using a 
sensitive and specific technique must be done, and complete antibody specificities (or safe 
antigens) must be identified for high PRA patients. Centers that utilize such techniques have 
reported success in predicting crossmatches (27, 28). Antibody screening methods and reagents 
are continuously being improved and expanded, which will further improve the ability to predict 
crossmatches. 
Data management can be complicated in kidney exchange programs. In New England we 
have developed a web-based data entry form that will enable each center to enter their own 
patient and donor information. A designated coordinator is important to simplify communication 
and ensure complete and accurate data is entered. In addition, high-level algorithmic programs 
are available that can handle the exchanges for a large population of pairs. 
Development of regional exchange programs, such as that under way in New England, are 
important for increasing the number of patients who can receive living donor kidney transplants, 
and will also help decrease the number of patients waiting for a kidney on the deceased donor 
wait list. Because the percentage of incompatible patient-donor pairs who can benefit from 2-
way exchange increases as the population of pairs available for exchange grows, expanding local 
exchange programs to include regional and possibly a national exchange program should be 
advantageous.  And since a substantial number of additional patients can receive transplants if 3-
way exchanges are feasible, developing the ability to identify and perform 3-way exchanges will 
also be very worthwhile. Although the advantage of using 3-way exchanges cannot be confirmed 
without prospective studies, every successful match means that two or more recipients receive a 
transplant they otherwise would not have gotten, and every attempt to increase the number of 
transplants should be included in an exchange program. 
Finally, a national system may be needed to secure a sufficient number of patient-donor 
incompatible pairs to make the opportunity of identifying compatible donors timely and realistic. 
However, the administration of such a system will need the cooperation of the entire transplant 
community to assure an ethical and medical oversight that is protective of the recipient and the 
donor.  
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Table 1. Mutually compatible patients in local patient dataset. 
 
 R1 R6 R12 R13 R24 R26 R28 R29 R30 R31 R38 R41 R42 R43 R45 
R1    x x x  x     x x  
R6               x 
R12        x        
R13 x         x      
R24 x         x      
R26 x         x      
R28               x 
R29 x  x      x  x     
R30        x        
R31    x x x       x x  
R38        x        
R41               x 
R42 x         x      
R43 x         x      
R45  x     x     x    
 
x indicates the row patient is compatible with at least one donor of the column patient and the 
column patient is compatible with at least one donor of the row patient. 
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Table 2A. Example of one possible combination of 2-way exchanges 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #1 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R28 O 0% 0%   D28.2 Sib B A1,23; B8,70; Bw6; DR3; 
DQ2; DR52 
ABO 
R45 B 0% 41% DR53 A32; B7,40; 
DR8,14,4, 53 
D45 Child O A11; B62,75; Bw6; DR2,4; 
DQ1,3; DR53, 51 
Pos XM 
Exchange #1 –D28.2 gives to R45 and D45 gives to R28.  
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #2 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody specificity Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R29 A 26% nd A11, 3, 10, 25, 26, 32 D29 Child O A11,2; B27,55; Bw4,6; 
DR1,12; DQ1,7; DR52 
Pos XM 
R38 O 0% 0%  D38 Spouse A A23,74; B7; Bw6; DR1,9; 
DQ1,2; DR53 
ABO 
Exchange #2 – D29 gives to R38 and D38 gives to R29. 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #3 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R1 B 13% 0%  None D1 Spouse A A1,2; B8,63; Bw4,6; 
DR3,13; DQ1,2; DR52 
ABO 
R13 A 2% 0%   D13.2 Sib B A1,30; B8,41; Bw6; DR3,7; 
DQ2; DR52,53 
ABO 
Exchange #3 - D13.2 gives to R1 and D1 gives to R13 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #4 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R31 B 0% 0%   D31 Spouse A A1,3; B14,57; Bw4,6; DR7; 
DQ2,3; DR53 
ABO 
R26 A 0% 0%   D26 Unrelated B A2,29; B7; Bw6; DR13; 
DQ1; DR52 
ABO 
Exchange #4 - D31 gives to R26 and D26 gives to R31 
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Table 2B. Matching when 2-way and 3-way exchanges are possible. 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #1 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody specificity Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R29 A 26% nd A11, 3, 10, 25, 26, 32 D29 Child O A11,2; B27,55; Bw4,6; 
DR1,12; DQ1,7; DR52 
Pos XM 
R38 O 0% 0%  D38 Spouse A A23,74; B7; Bw6; DR1,9; 
DQ1,2; DR53 
ABO 
Exchange #2 – D29 gives to R38 and D38 gives to R29. 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #2 (3 way exchange) 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R19 B 0% 50% DR12; 
DQ2, 7 
 D19 Child B A24,32; B7,35; Bw6; 
DR2,3; DQ1,2; DR51,52 
Pos XM 
R43 A 0% 0%   D43 Spouse B A24; B7,39; DR2,8; DQ1,4; 
DR51 
ABO 
R31 B 0% 0%   D31 Spouse A A1,3; B14,57; Bw4,6; DR7; 
DQ2,3; DR53 
ABO 
Exchange #2 - D43 gives to R19, D31 gives to R43, and D19 gives to R31 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #3 (3-way exchange) 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R45 B 0% 41% DR53 A32; B7,40; 
DR8,14,4;53 
D45 Child O A11; B62,75; Bw6; DR2,4; 
DQ1,3; DR51,53 
Pos XM 
R28 O 0% 0%   D28.2 Sib B A1,23; B8,70; Bw6; DR3; 
DQ2; DR52 
ABO 
    Safe ags Recip HLA      
R41 O 93% nd A1,11,30; 
B13,18,37,
62,75 
A33; B14; 
Bw6; DR1,11; 
DQ1,7; DR52 
D41.1 Unrelated O A2,24; B50,52; Bw4,6; 
DR2,3; DQ1,2; DR51,52 
Pos XM 
Exchange #3 - D28.2 gives to R45, D41.1 gives to R28, and D45 gives to R41 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange #4 (3-way exchange) 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
 
Relation 
Donor 
ABO Donor HLA Type 
Reason 
Incompat. 
R24 AB 36% 42% A23,24,9;  D42  B A3; B44,62; DR1,4; DQ1,3; ABO 
  21 
DR8,11 Spouse DR53 
R42 A 0% 0%   D1  Spouse A1 
A1,2; B8,63; Bw4,6; 
DR3,13; DQ1,2; DR52 ABO 
R1 B 13% 0%  none D24  Cousin B 
A1,24; B35,46; Bw6; 
Cw1,4; DR2,12; DQ5; 
DR51,52 
Called ab 
Exchange #4: D42 gives to R24, D1 gives to R42, and D24 gives to R1 
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Table 2C. Possible 5-way exchange 
 
Recipients and their incompatible donors prior to exchange 
Recip 
ID 
Recip 
ABO 
Cl I 
PRA 
Cl II 
PRA 
Antibody 
spec. 
Prev. mm 
antigens 
Donor 
ID 
Relation Donor 
ABO 
Donor HLA type Reason 
incompat. 
R45 B 0% 41% DR53 A32; B7,40; 
DR8,14,4;53 
D45 Child O A11; B62,75; Bw6; DR2,4; 
DQ1,3; DR51,53 
Pos XM 
R24 AB 36% 42% A23,24,9; 
DR8,11 
 D24 Cousin B A1,24; B35,46; Bw6; 
Cw1,4; DR2,12; DQ5; 
DR51,52 
Pos XM 
R26 A 0% 0%   D26 Unrelated B A2,29; B7; Bw6; DR13; 
DQ1; DR52 
ABO 
R16 O 0% 0%   D16 Spouse A A2,34; B60; Bw6; DR2; 
DQ1; DR51 
ABO 
    Safe ags Recip HLA      
R41 O 93% nd A1,11,30; 
B13,18,37,
62,75 
A33; B14; 
Bw6; DR1,11; 
DQ1,7; DR52 
D41.1 Unrelated O A2,24; B50,52; Bw4,6; 
DR2,3; DQ1,2; DR51,52 
Pos XM 
5-way exchange - D24 gives to R45, D26 gives to R24, D16 gives to R26, D41.1 gives to R16, D45 gives to R41 
 
PRA, panel reactive antibody; Prev mm antigens, mismatched HLA recipient was exposed to during previous transplant(s); Ab spec, HLA antibody specificity in 
recipient serum; Relation, relation of donor to recipient; Reason incompat, reason donor was incompatible to recipient (ABO mismatch or positive crossmatch); 
Safe ags, HLA antigens patients serum does not react with; Recip HLA, Recipient HLA type. 
 
 
